I am not referring, of course, to the kind of double life, often exploited in melodrama, where the official is a paragon of virtue in public, while in private he leads a life of shame. In fact, it is my experience that this view is quite misleading, though you will encounter it in the most advanced intellectual circles. There you will still find it believed that if only the public knew the whole truth about public men, it would be a very dark truth indeed.
That there is a dark truth about most public men I am convinced. Nothing seems to me more certain than that most of them are leading dark, illicit and subterranean lives of moderation and reason. They flaunt their vices to the public; they shiver and quake at the thought that some indiscreet journalist will expose them to the world as men of virtue and common sense. I can think at this moment of several leading politicians in Washington who would rather be whipped than have it known how sound are their views on the bonus, the tariff, the inter-allied debts and the League of Nations.
A journalist could do them no greater injury than to repeat things which would convince the majority of their audience that these public men were worthy of the utmost confidence. When this sort of thing happens once, you are angry. When it happens under all sorts of circumstances you realize that it is not simply a question of personal integrity. You begin to realize that you are feeling the effects of a revolutionary change in the technic of diplomacy. You are forced to acknowledge, I think, that here is an aspect of the transition from a diplomacy whichwas the private concern of a small class of insiders to a diplomacy which is compelled to satisfy the fluctuating politics of a legislature and the still vaguer sentiment of the country as a whole. The transition, to be sure, is not complete, and probably it will never in our time be carried to its logical conclusion.
Much, indeed, that is meant to seem like perfect obedience to popular sentiment is in reality a carefully stage-managed show. The so-called plenary sessions of the various international congresses are a prime example. These stately gatherings are a concession to the ritual of democracy, rather than decisive and executive councils. Even more than in our national party conventions, the things which are publicly decided have been privately decided beforehand.
Nevertheless, in the hotel rooms or in the nearby villa, where decisions are privately made, the negotiators are to an unprecedented degree conscious of opinion in the legislature and among the voters in the dim distance. They are continually aware of the fact that if they guess wrong about their henchmen or the rank and file, they will be broken politically.
And yet these opinions which the statesman is forever trying to estimate are rarely a clear guide to the questions before him. From the official point of view they are danger signals, telling him where he must not trespass at all, where he may venture at his peril, and where he must make a wide and troublesome detour. All democratic statesmen respect these signposts, or they are ruined. They differ in their reading of them. Some of them can tell the difference between popular taboos that are deeply founded, and taboos which are organized, publicityman bluff. Some statesmen cannot tell the difference, and to them every stray cat, every goat and every donkey looks like a sacred cow.
PROGRAM OF CONTRADICTION
Allowing for personal differences among statesmen, differences of courage and interest in truth, we must THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY note that almost without exception, especially in the realm of foreign affairs, the modern statesman is caught in a contradiction: he must defer to the force of opinion because that is where power resides; yet he must deal with affairs in which public opinion is only a very partial, and almost always a merely negative guide to policy. Soon he discovers that there is no preestablished harmony between government for the people and government by the people. And his indulgence in rhetoric, his evasions of the real issue, his fright at plain speech, his descent into florid abstraction is, in a very large degree, the attempt to effect a working compromise between that which at the moment interests the people, and that which he believes to be in the interest of the people. Between his guess at what the public wishes and his own best judgment of what the public needs, he generally manages to split his personality into two selves, neither of which is on friendly terms with the other.
This great democratic difficulty becomes most apparent in international relations, although samples of it are only too evident within the national boundaries. But at least in domestic affairs the parties concerned speak the same language, have common habits and more or less similar environments. The other side, and the other aspects, cannot be wholly dodged, and so they receive some consideration. But in foreign affairs the others concerned in the business are fenced off, frequently by a spike fence, each not only within its own language and tradition but within its own experience.
Almost inevitably, then, people see the relation only as it affects them. They see what this year's taxes will be if interest on the inter-allied debt is not paid. What next year's trade will be if the interest is paid, they see less easily, and what the peace of the world will be if we insist on keeping European budgets unbalanced, they see hardly at all. They judge their own larger interests as a nation, and their still larger interests as members of the human family, by those taxes, those cheap Czechoslovakian wrist-watches, by the default on these bonds, by that bit of experience which has affected them most painfully and vividly.
"No one," says William James, "sees further into a generalization than his own knowledge of detail extends." And therefore, the same man, any man almost, left to his own judgment, will think nothing of demanding payment of the debt to lighten his tax burden, a prohibitive tariff against goods to pay the debt in order to protect himself against competition, and the open door throughout the world to expand his foreign trade. A public opinion resting on no better foundation than immediate experience is quite capable of insisting on such a contradictory program.
And statesmen, bowing to what they call the public will, are quite capable of pretending that such a program of contradictions is feasible. Only in private will they tell you that, of course, it is not feasible. But what can they do about it? Public opinion has decreed, and they must obey.
IMPORTANCE OF REAL LEADERSHIP
But must they? Only on the unnecessary assumption that their presence in public office is essential to the safety of the republic, is it necessary for public men to drift with the tides of opinion. For how can opinion ever arrive at a real view of a great international question if those on the inside, if those in the know, spend their time waiting for instructions from those of us on the outside who cannot possibly know? On questions as complex as those awaiting settle-ment in the world today, it is utterly impossible to rely on the mysterious wisdom of the people. And any statesman who pretends that he does rely on it, or can, is trifling with questions of life and death.
For since knowledge of these intricate and far-reaching matters cannot be obtained by consulting your conscience or your sentiments about the bonus or the income tax, the only possible means by which democracy can act successfully in foreign affairs is access to the knowledge which the insiders possess, because the sources of information are in their hands. For the executive in any democratic country to keep his knowledge a secret, and then wait to act until public opinion approximates what he secretly believes, is absurd in theory and unworkable in practice. It ends in drift, factionalism and the deterioration of the standards of public life.
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